Category Archive: Human Factors

Contrasting Outcomes in Multiteam Systems – Part 5

Lessons from the study – Selection and training of MTS aircrew The findings of Bienefeld and Grote’s study has implications for selection and training of crew to perform within and across teams for enhanced aviation safety [3]. The salient points were:- Selection of MTS aircrews is to be based on the leadership potential of the …

Continue reading »

Contrasting Outcomes in Multiteam Systems – Part 4

What does Bienefeld & Grote’s Study on Multiteam Systems (MTS) say? Bienefeld and Grote [3] conducted a study on 84 cockpit and cabin crews (n = 504), simulating an in-flight emergency in a high fidelity simulator with two-man cockpit and a fully furnished passenger cabin. Their aim was “to examine the effect of shared leadership …

Continue reading »

Contrasting Outcomes in Multiteam Systems – Part 3

Shared Leadership in Multiteam systems During an on board emergency, despite their differing roles and responsibilities, the crew work interdependently with the primary objective to protect and save lives of all passengers and crew on board, after the aircraft has landed safely. The shared goal of safety during the dynamic and stressful environment of an …

Continue reading »

Contrasting Outcomes in Multiteam Systems – Part 2

Air France Flight 358 – 02 August 2005 [2] What Happened? It was an Airbus A340-313, which departed Paris, France on a scheduled flight to Toronto, Ontario, Canada with 297 passengers and 12 crew members on board. Thunderstorms were forecasted at Toronto prior to its departure, and while approaching, the crew was advised of weather-related …

Continue reading »

Contrasting Outcomes in Multiteam Systems – Lessons from Air Canada 797 and Air France 358 accidents

In commercial aviation, there are two teams at work during flight: cockpit crew and cabin crew. The former being led by the captain who also has the overall responsibility of the flight, with the first officer/co-pilot as a member in the cockpit. The purser leads the flight attendants in the cabin. The formal leadership roles …

Continue reading »

Old Facts, New Insights – Lessons from A-320 Part 4

This interesting study by Sarter and Woods revealed that the automation surprises “occur when the crew detects that automation or aircraft behaviour is deviating from their expectations” [2]. In turn, such ‘surprises’ provide the vital opportunity (and learning) to correct unexpected or undesirable aircraft behaviour.

Continue reading »

Old Facts, New Insights – Lessons from A-320 Part 3

A spate of incidents and accidents during 1990s suggested that pilots flying modern ‘glass cockpit’ aircraft “sometimes fail to detect unanticipated and undesirable automation behaviour in time to recover” [2, 8, 9]. Hence it is important to understand the likelihood of human error for the A-320 pilots monitoring the status and behaviour of the automated …

Continue reading »

Old Facts, New Insights – Lessons from A-320 Part 2

The details of the automation surprises faced by the pilots participating in the questionnaire survey is presented hereafter [2].

Continue reading »

Old Facts, New Insights – Lessons from A-320

Automation surprises result from an imbalance between ‘autonomy’ and ‘authority’ of advanced automated systems and the gaps in the operator’s mental model of the system and its interactions. The vital factor at play in such cases could be low observability interfaces in novel (“nonroutine elements”) situations with operator caught in a bind while trying to …

Continue reading »

Old Facts, New Insights – Surprises in Glass Cockpit

The final report of crash of Air France Flight AF 447 stated that the precipitating event of the accident was “temporary inconsistency between the measured airspeeds…..that led in particular to autopilot disconnection” which was compounded by “inappropriate control inputs that destabilized the flight path” [1]. This accident has brought the focus of the aviation community …

Continue reading »

Older posts «